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The Brain's "New" Science: Psychology, 
Neurophysiology, and Constraint 
Gary Hatfieldt 
University of Pennsylvania 
There is a strong philosophical intuition that direct study of the brain can and will 
constrain the development of psychological theory. When this intuition is tested against 
case studies on the neurophysiology and psychology of perception and memory, it turns 
out that psychology has led the way toward knowledge of neurophysiology. An abstract 
argument is developed to show that psychology can and must lead the way in neuro-
scientific study of mental function. The opposing intuition is based on mainly weak 
arguments about the fundamentality or objectivity of physics or physiology in relation 
to psychology. 
1. Introduction. Philosophers have long speculated about the strong con-
straints that brain science will or should provide for any future possible 
psychological theories. Hempel (1949) advocated replacing psychological 
language with physical language, which would be used to describe both 
behavior and brain states. Quine (1974) maintained that mentalistic talk 
could be tolerated in psychology only provisionally, as a means toward a 
full physiological or physical explanation of behavior. P. S. Churchland 
(1986) foresaw the replacement of "folk psychology" with neuroscientific 
descriptions. On the other side, Fodor (1974) has long plumped for the 
autonomy of psychology from neuroscience, by analogy with the ( alleged) 
hardware-independence of computer programs. 
These predictions of elimination or strong constraint were undertaken 
in virtually complete innocence of actual cases of interaction between sci-
entific psychology and neurophysiology. Quine's discussions were simply 
so many promissory notes about the future course of science (Quine 1974, 
33-34). Churchland's Neurophilosophy did not address genuine interac-
tions between psychology and neuroscience, because the representative of 
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psychology in that book was (philosophers') folk psychology, not the ac-
tual results of experimental psychology (see Corballis 1988, Hatfield 
1988a). Further, Fodor's case for autonomy relied heavily on the com-
puter metaphor (Fodor, 1975, Chs. 1-2), which turned out not to be the 
only game in town, and in any event he dismissed (1975, 17) the impor-
tance of physiology for psychology without engaging the living body of 
work in physiological psychology. 
Contemporary philosophy of science seeks to understand the cognitive 
features of living science. Without aiming to be merely descriptive, it seeks 
to capture conceptual relations and explanatory structures that have a 
basis in actual scientific practice. In this article I appeal to real cases in 
support of the argument that, typically, psychological theory has led the 
way toward neuroscientific understanding. Section 2 surveys some major 
results in sensory psychology. Section 3 examines the strongest alleged 
case for the neuroscientific revision of fundamental psychological theory, 
the neurological finding of selectively preserved memory in amnesiacs. In 
Section 4, I offer a simple and straightforward conceptual argument that 
psychology must lead the way toward a neuroscientific understanding of 
mental function and the brain's role therein. These reflections and argu-
ments raise the question of how it could have seemed so obvious to some 
philosophers that neuroscience must strongly condition or even replace 
psychology. Section 5 examines this question and asks what it means to 
say instead that psychology conditions neuroscience. 
2. Sensory Physiology: Psychology Leads and Constrains Neurophysiology. 
Sensory physiology is an area of rich interaction between neuroscience 
and psychology, and one in which knowledge is well advanced in both 
domains. I consider the relation between psychology and neurophysiology 
in three historical cases that span the modern period. The earliest case 
serves as a reminder that a basic functional parsing of the body and ner-
vous system is itself a fundamental achievement, and is by no means ob-
vious. The three cases are binocular single vision, stereopsis, and opponent 
processes in color vision. 
2.1. Newton and Binocular Single Vision. We have two eyes with over-
lapping fields of vision, which receive separate impressions from objects 
in the area of overlap, and yet we usually see such objects singly. Since 
antiquity, these facts have led visual theorists to speculate about how sin-
gle vision is achieved (Wade 1987). Early theorists, including Galen (dis-
cussed in Siegel 1970, 59-62), Alhazen (Ibn al-Haytham), and Witelo (dis-
cussed in Hatfield and Epstein 1979), proposed a physiological unification 
of binocular stimulation in the optic chiasma (where the two optic nerves 
meet). But since the optic nerves separate at the chiasma and continue on 
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to separate sides of the brain, a question remained about how the post-
chiasmally separate optic nerves mediate single vision (see, e.g., the figure 
in Discourse 5 of Descartes' Dioptric ([1637] 1958, 149). 
Various early modem solutions were proposed, including Descartes' 
unification of binocular stimulation at the pineal gland (Descartes [1664] 
1985, 105). In the Queries to his Optics, Newton (1704) speculatively ad-
vanced the anatomical scheme that in fact underlies single vision. He pro-
posed that nerve fibers from the two eyes "partially decussate" -that is, 
partially cross--in the optic chiasma, so that fibers from each hemifield 
of the retina join in the chiasma and proceed to their respective side of the 
brain in a manner that preserves retinotopic order. His reasoning was 
based on some erroneous comparative anatomy (he mistakenly believed 
that fish and chamelia lack a chiasma), but his functional conjecture was 
sound and was confirmed by observations on brain-damaged patients dur-
ing the eighteenth century (Finger 1994, 83). One of the foremost findings 
in sensory physiology in the mid-twentieth century was the discovery, us-
ing single cell recording techniques in cats and primates, of neurons in the 
visual cortex that are activated only by input from both eyes (Barlow, 
Blakemore, and Pettigrew 1967; Poggio and Fischer 1977). Further, neu-
rons receiving stimulation from one or both eyes are laid out retinotopi-
cally across the back of the brain (Barlow 1990). So Newton's anatomical 
conjecture is largely confirmed (although the neurons from each eye ac-
tually unite only cortically, and merely cross and become contiguous in 
the chiasma). Since only rudimentary anatomical knowledge of the brain 
was available in his time, with no techniques for examining neural micro-
structure, it is clear that Newton's understanding of the psychological 
function of single vision led the way to his neuroanatomical hypothesis. 
2.2. Stereopsis. Our two eyes fixate the same objects from slightly dif-
ferent perspectives, which means that they each receive slightly different 
images of those objects. The disparities between the two images serve as a 
powerful source of information for the relative depth of the parts of objects 
or among objects. (Convergence, or the angles formed by the optical axes, 
serves as an independent source of information for absolute depth, via the 
geometry of angle-side-angle.) In the decades following the discovery of the 
stereoscope by Charles Wheatstone in the 1830s, P. L. Panum, A. W. Volk-
mann, W. Wundt, H. Helmholtz, and E. Hering, among others, investigated 
the psychophysics of the depth response (see Turner 1994, 13-26). They 
studied many features of the depth response, including acuity for disparity, 
the temporal course of the response, and the efficacy of crossed vs. un-
crossed disparities (image elements reversed between the two eyes, or not). 
Although virtually nothing was known of the microphysiology of the brain, 
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these investigators framed various speculative hypotheses about the ana-
tomical and physiological basis of stereopsis. 
When binocularly driven neurons were discovered in the 1960s, some 
of them showed sensitivity to varying degrees of disparity. Investigators 
immediately conjectured that these "disparity detectors" serve the binoc-
u1ar depth response (Barlow et al. 1967). In this case, a newly discovered 
anatomical structure and its physiological activity were interpreted in re-
lation to a visual capacity whose properties had been discovered through 
psychophysical and psychological investigation alone. The precise psy-
chological mechanism by which the detection of local retinal disparities 
produces a depth response remains unknown. But subsequent investiga-
tion has shown a deep interaction among neurophysiological work, com-
putational simulation, and psychophysical studies. Bishop and Pettigrew, 
leaders in the neurophysiological and psychological study of stereopsis, 
conclude in their 1986 review of the field that individual neurophysiolog-
ical results continue to be interpreted largely on the basis of psychophys-
ical findings. 
In a 1992 review, Tychsen found work on stereopsis had recently un-
dergone a conceptual shift which he related to the neuroanatomical divi-
sion of visual neurophysiology into parvocellular and magnocellular path-
ways. The pathways are named for types of cells found in layers in the 
lateral geniculate nucleus, which then project cortically. Parvocellular neu-
rons are slow but finely tuned, magnocellular are fast and coarsely-tuned. 
Tyler (1990) applied these findings to binocular vision, distinguishing a 
fine, slow, global, foveal system that is good for static targets from a 
coarse, fast, local, wide-scope system, with greater sensitivity to moving 
targets. Although Tyler acknowledged that neuroanatomical studies pro-
vided "the inspiration for the psychophysical partition of sensory pro-
cessing into categories of specialized analysis" (Tyler 1990, 1877), he also 
noted that he himself had previously (Tyler 1983) postulated similar mul-
tiple systems of stereopsis "on the basis of psychophysical evidence alone." 
In now linking psychological theories of stereopsis with neurophysiolog-
ical findings, he hoped to facilitate testing "of proposed associations be-
tween the separable processes in the two domains" (Tyler 1990, 1894). 
Here there is linkage between neuroscience and psychology, but no prec-
edence of brain facts over psychological facts. Indeed, the psychological 
facts about stereopsis again led the way. 
2.3. Color Vision and Opponent Pathways. The golden age of visual 
science in the late nineteenth century saw two competing accounts of color 
vision (Turner 1994, Chs. 6-7). Helmholtz revived and extended Thomas 
Young's proposal that there are only three types of color sensitive elements 
in the retina, each responding maximally to a particular wavelength 
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(Helmholtz [1867] 1925, 2: 134-146). Perceived color then results from the 
combination of stimulation from the three types of elements. In opposition 
to this simple trichromatic model of color vision, Hering argued that color 
vision results from three opponent processes in the central nervous system, 
one serving red-green perception, one blue-yellow, and one black-white 
(Hering 1875; Turner 1994, 130-134). Neither of these arguments was 
based on knowledge of retinal anatomy and microphysiology. Indeed, the 
photic properties of the cones, which are the retinal element subserving 
daytime color vision, were directly measured only in the latter part of the 
twentieth century (Kaiser and Boynton 1996, Ch. 5). Helmholtz's argu-
ments were based on color matching experiments ( on both normal and 
color-deficient observers), in which lights of known spectral composition 
are adjusted until they look the same. Hering's arguments were based on 
similar types of measurements, and on phenomenological observations. 
On phenomenal grounds, Hering contended that there are four color pri-
maries: red, yellow, blue, and green. He argued that afterimages reveal 
adaptation effects among the four primaries, thereby revealing linkage in 
the underlying physiology: yellow produces a blue afterimage, red a green 
one, and so on. He also observed that color deficient individuals are always 
"red and green blind" ( or "blue and yellow blind"), but are never simply 
"red blind" or "green blind." On these grounds he speculatively postu-
lated yoked physiological process underlying red-green and blue-yellow 
perception, which operate in opponent fashion, so that a red sensation 
arises when the red-green channel is driven one direction, and a green 
sensation when it is driven in the opposite, or opponent, direction. In the 
1950s Leo Hurvich and Dorothea Jameson revived the opponent process 
theory, arguing from psychophysical data obtained in certain kinds of 
color mixture experiments ( cancellation experiments, reviewed in Hurvich 
1981, Chs. 5-6). Subsequently, opponent neural mechanisms were discov-
ered in the retina, lateral geniculate nucleus, and other brain loci. The 
theory that the three types of cone in normal human eyes are linked neu-
rophysiologically into opponent processes is now widely accepted (Kaiser 
and Boynton 1996, Ch. 7). 
In the three cases reviewed, psychophysics and phenomenology led the 
way to the postulation and subsequent confirmation of neural mecha-
nisms. Which is not to say that researchers do not work the other way 
around, using specific neurophysiological findings to generate new re-
search questions. Ken Nakamura (1990) contended that findings about 
brain anatomy called for some new psychological theorizing. Neurophys-
iologists had found that a larger portion of cerebral cortex is devoted to 
vision than had been thought, and that the areas are highly subdivided. 
He described this as a case in which, for once, "it is the physiologists who 
seem to be leading the way, at least as far as higher visual functions are 
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concerned." In order to redress "this imbalance between psychology and 
neurophysiology," he offered a "speculative theory as to the overall func-
tional organization of the visual system" (Nakamura 1990, 411). Physi-
ology had shown the existence of apparently specialized areas, and psy-
chology would now propose a functional organization for them, drawing 
on work from cognitive psychology, psychophysics, physiology, and ar-
tificial intelligence. Peter Kaiser and Robert Boynton, co-authors of the 
standard handbook on human color vision, allow that in work on color 
vision, findings from anatomy, neurophysiology, and photochemistry have 
sometimes inspired new psychophysical experiments, but they maintain 
that "the data of the psychophysicist, together with theories developed 
from such data, provide a framework within which the electrophysiologist 
conducts his research" (Kaiser and Boynton 1996, 26-27). Which suggests 
that while physiological facts and theories may inspire or confirm research 
and theory cast in psychological language, psychological language remains 
the primary vocabulary for describing the functions being investigated, 
including those investigated in neurophysiological research. 
3. The Neuropsychology of Memory: H. M. Revisited. Standing in contrast 
to the finding of Section 2, Patricia Churchland (1986, 1996) has claimed 
that in some areas of work neurological results have led the way to a 
radical rethinking of basic theoretical categories in psychology. She makes 
the boldest claim for work in memory, declaring that "some data discov-
ered by neuropsychologists are so remarkable, and so contrary to common 
assumptions, that they suggest that some basic assumptions about mem-
ory may be in need of radical revision" (Churchland 1986, 150). What are 
these basic assumptions? Are they merely the assumptions of "folk psy-
chology," or does she mean the assumptions of scientific (experimental) 
psychology? Although "folk psychology" is her usual target, Churchland 
here addresses experimental psychology directly. She asserts that psycho-
logical theory on topics such as memory is in a "statu nascendi," its current 
level of development being "pretheoretical" (1986, 149, 153). But she 
found cause for hope. Studies of amnesiac patients led some neuropsy-
chologists "to postulate two memory systems, each with its own physio-
logical basis" (1986, 371). The two systems in question are the descriptive 
and procedural memories of Squire and Cohen 1984. As Churchland 
(1986, 372) tells it, their observations on amnesiac patients led them to 
posit distinct memory subsystems of a sort unlike those on offer from 
psychologists who study memory in the intact human. 
The issue in question is not whether neurological observations are ger-
mane to psychological research on memory, but whether in this case neu-
rological observation led to the introduction of new theoretical categories, 
and specifically, to the introduction of a novel distinction between descrip-
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tive and procedural memory systems. As it turns out, in Squire and Co-
hen's case (Cohen and Squire 1980, Squire and Cohen 1984, Cohen 1984) 
the theoretical framework they adopted was drawn from previous work 
in experimental psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy, as were the 
motivation for the empirical questions they asked and the experimental 
procedures they adopted. 
The relevant part of Squire and Cohen's work concerned preserved 
learning and memory capacities in amnesiacs. The "preserved" capacities 
are those unaffected or only partially affected by the cause of the amnesia. 
It was well known that amnesiacs who suffer severe memory deficits may 
suffer no effects on perceptual-motor learning and memory (Milner, Cor-
kin, and Teubner 1968). Squire and Cohen asked whether other sorts of 
skills are preserved. In Cohen and Squire 1980 they showed that amnesiac 
patients could perform well on a pattern-analyzing skill, which involved 
reading mirror-reversed words. Although the patients could not remember 
previous trials, even from day to day, their performance showed dramatic 
improvement over three consecutive days of testing and in a retest three 
months later. Cohen and Squire (1980) interpreted their results in relation 
to proposals made by Kolers (1975) and by Winograd (1975). Kolers 
(1975) used psychological experiments to study memory in intact adult 
humans. He interpreted his findings on sentence-recognition tasks (includ-
ing tasks with geometrically reversed stimuli) by distinguishing between 
"operational or procedural" and "semantic or substantive" memory. Ko-
lers drew this distinction from a discussion of "knowing how" vs. "know-
ing that" in a book on the philosophy of education by Israel Scheffler 
(1965), who in turn drew upon Gilbert Ryle's (1949) analysis of intelligent 
behavior. Winograd (1975) characterized the distinction between "know-
ing how" and "knowing that" as dividing procedural (programmed) from 
declarative (data base) knowledge. In a subsequent review and expansion 
of their results, Squire and Cohen (1984, 3 7) articulated their distinction, 
drawing directly on Ryle (1949), on work in psychology (Bruner 1969), 
and on artificial intelligence (including Winograd 1975). Finally, Cohen 
(1984) retested the much-studied amnesiac H. M. on a cognitive skill that 
had been well-studied by experimental psychologists, the "Tower of Ha-
noi" problem, and he further articulated the procedural-declarative dis-
tinction, again drawing on Ryle, Bruner, Kolers, Winograd, and other 
work in artificial intelligence. 
In this case, the methods of testing, the framework for posing empirical 
questions, and the theoretical concepts used are drawn from previous work 
at a psychological or philosophical level of analysis. Moreover, Squire and 
Cohen (1984, 4) did not present their work as requiring revision of basic 
ideas about memory, but as a challenge to previous views on amnesia as 
a unitary phenomenon (an assumption they attributed to previous work 
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in neurology). They presented themselves as developing and extending 
theoretical conceptions of memory and skilled performance extant in the 
psychological and philosophical literatures. Tests on various clinical pop-
ulations provided a source of data about ways in which the normal func-
tioning of human memory could be disrupted. Here, neurological results 
did not result in a fundamental rethinking of the basic categories of psy-
chological theory, but in a refinement of those categories and an ability 
to relate them to brain loci known to be damaged in the amnesiac patients. 
This is "coevolution" of psychology and neuroscience as Churchland 
(1986) would have it, but with a genuine theoretical contribution coming 
from extant theoretical psychology, a contribution that Churchland 
missed in her portrayal of psychology as being in a "pretheoretical" state 
on these issues. 
This case study does not show that reflection on neurological results, 
or on images or other recordings of brain activity, could not challenge the 
fundamental categories of psychological theory. Nonetheless, the image 
of neuroscience as arriving at its results independently of previous psy-
chological theory invokes a naive Baconianism that is implausible. Ex-
perimental findings of the sort achieved by Squire and Cohen require pos-
ing questions to nature. This is true even if nature (or surgical procedures) 
have provided a "natural experiment" through a brain lesion. Subjects' 
performances are evaluated through systematic tests, not casual observa-
tion. Systematic experimental procedures are devised against a back-
ground of previous theory and previous experimental paradigms. Even 
casual observations are interpreted against a background of theory. In the 
case of psychological capacities such as learning and memory, it is natural 
to suppose that psychological theory will provide the background. 
Again, this is not to say that neurological observation and neurophys-
iological measurement have not and will not continue to contribute to the 
advance of psychological theory. Indeed, subsequent work in memory has 
seen continuing interaction between psychological and neuroscientific re-
search. The theoretical discussion has advanced to include alternatives to 
the "memory systems" approach favored by Squire (1987) and by exper-
imental psychologists such as Tulving (1983). The alternative theory pro-
poses that data from brain-damaged patients do not entail separate mem-
ory systems (despite the finding of a "double dissociation," which is often 
taken to imply distinct systems), because the data are also consistent with 
the hypothesis that various processing stages have been disrupted (Roe-
diger, Srinivas, and Weldon 1989). Data from animal studies, clinical ob-
servations, and experiments on normal children and adults are all used in 
testing theories about the psychology of memory and its neurophysiolog-
ical substrate (see, e.g., Foster and Jelicic 1999). Neuroscience has not 
provided an independent source of theory, but an additional source of 
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data about function and about brain localization. That is a real contri-
bution. But, as we shall see in Section 4, it is unclear that neuroscientific 
data provide any firmer constraint on psychological theory than do other 
kinds of data. 
4. The Brain as a Mental Organ. Review of some central cases from psy-
chological science and neuroscience shows that psychology has led the way 
in the study of the brain, at least so far. At the same time, bottom-up 
studies of nervous systems and brains have been revolutionized during the 
twentieth century, as a result of new staining, recording, and scanning 
techniques. The neuron doctrine, the discovery and classification of neural 
transmitters, and the advent of brain imagery stand as real and indepen-
dent contributions of neuroscience. 
Given the rapid advances in brain science during the twentieth century, 
one might conjecture that the leading role played by psychology in my 
case studies was the product of the different growth rates of psychological 
and specifically neuroscientific knowledge. Knowledge of the microstruc-
ture of brain tissue and measurement of neural activity required the de-
velopment of microscopic techniques and technology for recording and, 
subsequently, imaging brain activity. The technology that made these re-
sults possible is less than a century old, and the more sophisticated tech-
niques have arisen only in the past two decades. By contrast, psychology, 
at least at the beginning, could operate with less equipment. It could get 
started taxonomizing psychological function on the basis of data available 
through observation of everyday experience or behavior. One might think 
that its descriptions served well in an instrumentally simpler day, before 
the advent of techniques that made possible a direct assault on the brain. 
But in these auspicious times one might expect, with Quine and Church-
land, that as science advances psychology will wither and neuroscientific 
concepts will replace its mentalistic descriptions. 
While granting the great advances in the direct study of the brain's 
properties, I reject this line of reasoning. I think an argument is available 
to show that psychology must provide the functional vocabulary for de-
scribing much of the brain's activity. To understand the brain we must 
come to understand not only its microanatomy and microphysiology, but 
its global functioning. Some of its global functions serve to control vege-
tative functions, such as breathing or digestion. But the brain is most 
famous for its role in realizing mental functions, including sense percep-
tion, memory, emotions, and higher cognitive abilities. The description of 
these functions is mentalistic. This mentalism does not restrict itself to a 
statically traditional vocabulary-the "folk psychology" of neurophilo-
sophical lore-but it avails itself of the developing technical vocabulary 
of psychological science. For example, as sensory psychology progressed, 
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the traditional "sense of touch" was partitioned into numerous sensory 
systems (for haptic form, pressure, temperature, and more), thereby over-
turning the tradition of the "five senses" (Scheerer 1995, 825, 851-856). 
In this case, a traditional classification was overturned as psychology ad-
vanced. Still, as sensory psychology has developed into a mature science 
its language has remained mentalistic, including talk of information, rep-
resentation, experienced qualities, perceived intensities, and so forth. Sim-
ilarly, the language of attention research, while it has grown more precise, 
shows continuity with centuries of reflection on the phenomena of atten-
tion, mentalistically described (Hatfield 1998). The mentalistic language 
of psychology should not be equated with outdated tradition. It is a living 
vocabulary. And it is the vocabulary for describing global brain function. 
The brain is a mental organ. 
These considerations provide the basis for a relatively straightforward 
argument to the effect that psychology must provide the primary theo-
retical vocabulary for describing many brain functions. The argument goes 
as follows: 
(1) The operations of the brain can be partitioned into various sub-
systems, study of which constitutes study of brain function. 
(2) Some of the functions realized by the brain are mental functions 
(e.g., perception, attention, memory, emotions). 
(3) Psychology is the experimental science that directly studies mental 
functions. 
(4) Hence psychology is the primary discipline covering a major sub-
set of brain functions. 
(5) Although it may be possible on occasion to reason from structure 
to function, in general knowledge or conjecture about function 
guides investigation of structure. 
(6) And so psychology leads the way in brain science. 
The premises have various bases, some tending toward the conceptual, 
some hinting at the empirical. But as in any conceptual argument about 
science, all of the premises have an empirical component. (1) records the 
fact that the brain is a complex system with identifiable subsystems, the 
operations of which can be usefully studied in relative independence of 
the other subsystems. (2) is a descriptive fact about the functions known 
to be realized by the brain. While it may seem bald and contentious, it is 
supported by reflection on the practice of brain science. Consult, for in-
stance, the major and minor subdivisions of standard textbooks in neu-
roscience (e.g., Kandel et al. 1991). Neuroscientists use a psychological 
taxonomy to describe brain systems. They parse its operation into sensory, 
motivational, and motor systems (Kandel et al. 1991, Pt. IV, Ch. 19), 
which are further subdivided into areas such as sensation and perception, 
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motor and motivational processes, language, and thought (Pts. V-IX). 
(3) comes as close to a conceptual truth as any. Psychology just is the 
science that studies mental functions in their own right. The only way to 
"eliminate" psychology from any foreseeable neuroscience would be sim-
ply to declare that theories of mental brain functions will now be called 
neuroscientific rather than psychological. (4) follows from (1)-(3). (5) is 
supported by reflection on the history of biological science and by the 
cases reviewed in Sections 2-3. It records the fact that typically, knowledge 
or conjecture about function guides the investigation of structure. Struc-
ture is hard to see in the absence of functional description. (5) blocks the 
supposition that a neuroscience devoid of psychological content could fre-
quently provide a "bottom-up" route to discovering global brain function. 
(6) follows from (4) and (5). 
5. Constraint. Suppose for the moment that this argument is correct. What 
implications does it have for the deeply held intuition that neuroscience is 
more basic than, and strongly conditions, psychology? 
One could argue that psychology leads neuroscience only because of 
the epistemic limitations of the investigators. Because we start from a 
position of ignorance, we need to move from function to structure. But 
once we come to understand brain structure, we will see how it limits brain 
function. This position is in fact intuitively plausible. But to understand 
its import we should consider further the notion of constraint. 
How does knowledge of one science constrain another? Once one un-
derstands chemistry, it becomes apparent that you cannot make water 
from carbon and nitrogen. The constituents constrain what can be done, 
or made, with them. Perhaps adequate knowledge of the brain would con-
strain psychology in the same way. 
This I think is the model of constraint implicit in the intuition that 
neuroscience must constrain psychology. At a very general level, we can 
suppose that some constraint of this sort is known to us. We perhaps can 
be said to know that the nervous system of an earthworm is incapable of 
supporting philosophical reflection. Given the worm's ganglia, we see that 
it is unable to do philosophy; there are not enough circuits to permit deep 
reflection. (In fact our belief here is largely guided by knowledge of earth-
worm behavior in relation to its ganglia, but let us ignore this for the sake 
of argument.) Beyond extreme and very general instances such as this, so 
little is known about how brains realize psychological states and processes 
that this sort of constraint from constituent structure has no consequences 
for practice, now or in the foreseeable future. 
A related intuition behind the idea that neuroscience constrains psy-
chology is that physics is the basic science of what there is, and neurosci-
ence is closer to physics than is psychology. Because physics is basic, it 
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sets boundaries on what is possible. As a practical matter, this argument 
falls prey to the observation that in the present state of knowledge we have 
little or no idea about how physical properties limit the psychological 
properties that material objects, and brains in particular, can realize. 
Still, the basicality of physics might be expressed through the notion of 
nomic asymmetry. It may be asserted as self-evident that psychology can-
not postulate processes that violate the laws of physics, whereas physics 
is unconstrained by psychology. But in our present state of knowledge, 
this claim simply does not hold. Consider an example. Let us suppose that 
physics precludes psychology from positing processes in which informa-
tion is transmitted from one location to another so that it arrives faster 
than the speed of light. We have been conditioned to nod assent to this. 
But should we treat this restriction as apodictic? Is it inconceivable that a 
psychological finding could cause us to question this statement? I think 
not. Conceive this. Under tightly controlled conditions, someone on earth 
is able to repeat what someone on the moon is thinking, and to do so with 
a time difference less than the time required for light to travel from the 
moon to earth. Teams of experts verify the empirical finding. Billionaires 
get interested in the phenomenon, and they hire the best scientists, phys-
icists included, to monitor the test. It is concluded that the test is fair. 
What shall we do now? Posit the existence of extraphysical information 
transmission? Or consider revising the speed-of-light limitation on physi-
cal transfers? The latter option would seem to be open. So in this case, 
psychological facts might call physical theories in question. More gener-
ally, if facts are facts and truth is truth, it strikes me that physical facts, 
and true physical theories, cannot conflict with psychological facts and 
true psychological theories any more than the latter can conflict with the 
former. 
The effective upshot of the basicality assumption is an abstract onto-
logical asymmetry between physics and psychology. You can have physi-
cal things with no psychological properties, but we believe that nothing 
with psychological properties can fail to be realized in matter. You cannot 
have psychological properties in the absence of physical realization. This 
abstract constraint is far removed from theorizing about the actual psy-
chological capacities realized in the brain, and from determining their re-
lations to brain structures. 
There are two additional, closely related intuitions that may help ex-
plain widespread assent to the notion that neuroscience is privileged over, 
and does or will control, psychology. The first is publicity: the brain is a 
physical object in the public domain. But an important area of psychology, 
the psychology of perception, concerns private objects, in the form of 
sensory experiences. So psychology is methodologically suspect. "Objec-
tive" knowledge is only of what is public. 
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This argument is interesting in the abstract, but it runs afoul of actual 
scientific achievement. The first areas of psychology to be made objective, 
in the sense of achieving repeatable quantitative results, were sensory per-
ception and psychophysics (Hearnshaw 1987, Ch. 9). A plausible descrip-
tion of the subject matter of psychophysics is that it charts the relations 
between physical stimuli and perceptual experience, as in the case of the 
trichromacy matching results achieved in the nineteenth century. The right 
hand term of laws in psychophysics, then, is the content of a mental state, 
the content of perceptual experience (see Shapiro 1995). So the much 
touted "privacy" of psychological states, whatever interest it might have, 
has not blocked the scientific study of such states. 
The second intuition concerns an alleged contrast in empirical rigor 
between physics and psychology. Allegedly, physics is hard and objective, 
psychology is soft and subjective. According to Quine (1974, 36), psycho-
logical notions thrive in darkness, and they will dissipate when physics, or 
neuroscience, turns on the light. This argument relies on an inaccurate 
portrayal of the achievements of psychology. Typically, it relies on the 
construal of psychology as "folk psychology," that is, as a codification of 
(allegedly) ordinary ascriptions of beliefs and desires to explain behavior. 
But, as suggested above, the mentalistic vocabulary of psychology is a 
living body of scientific description. If it is. to be challenged, it must be 
challenged on its own terms, and not, as often happens, by surreptitiously 
changing the subject so as to substitute so-called "folk psychology" for 
the corpus of scientific psychology. (On this point see also Hatfield 1988b, 
Wilkes 1980.) 
Let us consider briefly some ways in which psychology conditions and 
constrains brain science. Primarily, psychology provides the basic func-
tional description of numerous brain systems. This means that epistemi-
cally and methodologically psychology must lead the way in the study of 
global brain function. Ontologically, psychology may be seen as providing 
another constraint on brain structure. Brain structures presumably have 
evolved so as to realize advantageous psychological functions. For ex-
ample, trichromatic color systems allow finer discrimination of objects by 
color than do dichromatic systems. The neural structures underlying tri-
chromacy presumably exist in populations because of the psychological 
function they perform (Thompson 1995, Ch. 4). If this is so, then the 
ontology of the brain is affected diachronically, through selection for ad-
vantageous psychological functions. In this way, psychological function 
constrains brain ontology. (See Hatfield 1999 for further discussion.) 
6. Conclusion. Reflection on neuroscience and psychology suggests that 
psychology has and must condition and constrain neuroscience. In the 
area of sensory perception, knowledge of psychological function has led 
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the way in the individuation and investigation of visual neurophysiology. 
In neuropsychological investigation of memory, psychological theories of 
memory provided the framework within which questions were posed in 
the study of deficits caused by brain damage. 
The idea that neuroscience can or should deeply constrain psychology 
is based on two sorts of arguments. First, there are abstract arguments 
concerning publicity, mushiness, nomic asymmetry, and ontological asym-
metry. The first three sorts of argument are unconvincing. Ontological 
asymmetry provides a general constraint on solutions to the mind-body 
problem. But it does not offer real guidance for contemporary psychology. 
The second sort of argument, from constituent structure, is based on 
the hope that future understanding of the brain will permit strong con-
straints to be "read off' descriptions of neural structure and activity. At 
present, constraints of this sort are at best very general, such as that earth-
worms cannot do philosophy. We can hope that knowledge of the brain's 
properties will progress to the point where this sort of constraint from 
constituent elements becomes available. One thing is for sure. If brain 
science does develop to that extent, psychology will lead the way. 
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